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Nipah virus (NiV) is a paramyxovirus that causes se-
vere encephalitis in humans. During January 2004, twelve 
patients with NiV encephalitis (NiVE) were identiﬁ  ed in west-
central Bangladesh. A case–control study was conducted to 
identify factors associated with NiV infection. NiVE patients 
from the outbreak were enrolled in a matched case-control 
study. Exact odds ratios (ORs) and 95% conﬁ  dence intervals 
(CIs) were calculated by using a matched analysis. Climb-
ing trees (83% of cases vs. 51% of controls, OR 8.2, 95% CI 
1.25–∞) and contact with another NiVE patient (67% of cas-
es vs. 9% of controls, OR 21.4, 95% CI 2.78–966.1) were 
associated with infection. We did not identify an increased 
risk for NiV infection among persons who had contact with 
a potential intermediate host. Although we cannot rule out 
person-to-person transmission, case-patients were likely in-
fected from contact with fruit bats or their secretions.
H
enipaviruses (family Paromyxoviridae, genus Heni-
pavirus) are enveloped RNA viruses that cause respi-
ratory illness in pigs and horses and respiratory illness and 
encephalitis in humans (1–6). After a 4- to 18-day incuba-
tion period, human disease can rapidly progress from mild 
illness (fever, headache, myalgia) to coma and death within 
10 days; the case-fatality ratio is 40%–76% (3,7–10). The 
ﬁ   rst recognized human Henipavirus infections occurred 
in 1994 in Australia, where a respiratory disease among 
horses was associated with illness in 2 humans (11). The 
etiologic agent, Hendra virus, was subsequently isolated 
from asymptomatic ﬂ  ying foxes (fruit bats of the family 
Pteropodidae) (12). Field et al. (2) suggested that horses, 
identiﬁ  ed as the intermediate hosts linked to human illness, 
may have become infected through indirect contact with 
fruit bats (e.g., infected fetal bat tissues or ﬂ  uids).
The  ﬁ   rst reported human epidemic of encephalitis 
caused by another Henipavirus, Nipah virus (NiV), oc-
curred between September 1998 and April 1999 in Malay-
sia and Singapore and was associated with an outbreak of 
severe respiratory illness in pigs (13–15). Most (86%–93%) 
human NiV encephalitis (NiVE) infections during this out-
break involved occupational exposure to pigs, implicating 
these animals as an intermediate host for NiV (15–18). 
Outbreaks of NiVE occurred in Bangladesh during 2001 
and 2003, in areas where NiV antibody–positive fruit bats 
have been identiﬁ  ed (19). These reports, in addition to eco-
logic surveys conducted in Cambodia, have strengthened 
evidence that pteropid bats are the reservoir for Hendra and 
Nipah viruses (12,20–25).
An outbreak of encephalitis in Bangladesh was recog-
nized on January 21, 2004; it affected 2 villages of Goa-
lando township, Rajbari District, Dhaka Division, 70 km 
west of the city of Dhaka (Figure 1). Ten deaths were re-
ported among 12 ill persons with symptoms compatible 
with NiVE, resulting in a case-fatality ratio of 83% (9,23). 
Although previous outbreaks of NiVE outside Bangla-
desh involved primarily men and women >25 years of age 
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(5,16,17,19,26), most (75%) patients in this outbreak were 
boys <15 years of age. We describe a matched case-control 
study that was conducted to characterize the epidemiology 
of NiVE and, speciﬁ  cally, to determine if risk for NiVE 
was associated with contact with animals; an environmen-
tal exposure, activity, or behavior; or contact with other 
NiVE patients during the 2004 NiVE outbreak in Goalando 
township.
Study Participants, Materials, and Methods
A matched case-control study was conducted in Goa-
lando, Bangladesh (Figure 1), February 18–22, 2004. Hy-
potheses tested in this study, as mentioned above (e.g., 
increased risk for NiV infection caused by contact with ani-
mals, environmental exposure, contact with fruit in season) 
were based upon factors associated with previous outbreaks 
of NiVE in Malaysia, Singapore, and Bangladesh.
Case Deﬁ  nition
A conﬁ  rmed NiVE case-patient was deﬁ  ned as any pa-
tient with fever and symptoms compatible with encephalitis 
after December 15, 2003, with NiV-speciﬁ  c immunoglobu-
lin M antibodies in cerebrospinal ﬂ  uid (CSF) or serum by 
enzyme immunoassay (EIA). A probable case of NiVE 
was deﬁ  ned as a patient with a diagnosis of encephalitis 
in whom fever developed and who was living in the same 
village as a patient with a conﬁ  rmed case of NiVE after De-
cember 15, 2003. Cases remained in the probable category 
if the patient died and a specimen for laboratory conﬁ  rma-
tion could not be obtained.
We conducted a population census of the affected area 
in February 2004; this census was the basis for selecting 
controls. We identiﬁ  ed 3 controls for each case-patient. 
The controls were selected randomly from the popula-
tion and then matched to each case-patient on the basis 
of gender and age group. All households identiﬁ  ed during 
the census, including houses of case-patients and controls, 
were mapped by Global Positioning System, and data were 
uploaded into ERDAS Imagine 8.5 (Leica Geosystems, 
Atlanta, GA, USA) and merged with a November 2000 
IKONOS Geo 1-m satellite image of the outbreak area 
(Space Imaging, Thornton, CO, USA).
Participation was strictly voluntary, and written in-
formed consent was obtained for all participants; for those 
<18 years of age, individual and parental consent was ob-
tained. The Bangladesh Ministry of Health and Family 
Welfare that requested this investigation reviewed and ap-
proved all protocols.
Study Population
Probable and conﬁ  rmed cases identiﬁ  ed in 2 contigu-
ous villages of Goalando township (Figure 1) were in-
cluded in this study. Seven of the 12 cases were clustered 
within 3 households. Of these 7 clustered cases, 3 occurred 
in 1 household, and the remaining 4 were distributed in 2 
separate homes (Figures 1, 2). Therefore, we conducted 2 
separate analyses to assess the effect of case clustering on 
results. The ﬁ  rst analysis contained the complete dataset 
of 12 cases and 36 controls; the subanalysis consisted of 
8 cases (we randomly selected 1 case/household) and 24 
matched controls. Similar results (proportions, odds ratios 
[ORs], 95% conﬁ  dence intervals [CIs]) were obtained from 
both analyses. Thus, data presented in this article, including 
all tables, are derived from the complete dataset.
Specimen Collection and Testing
Serum samples and CSF were tested as previously de-
scribed (27). When possible, a serum specimen was col-
lected from controls.
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Figure 1. Top: Distribution of Nipah virus case (n = 12) and control 
(n = 36) households within the outbreak/study site of Goalando 
township, Bangladesh, January 2004. Number in the yellow 
triangle corresponds to household no. in Figure 2. Map also shows 
extreme habitat disturbance; areas under cultivation (for rice, sugar 
cane) are highlighted with “C,” and remaining trees (fruit trees and 
bamboo stands) with “T.” Bottom: Location of outbreak village.RESEARCH
Data Collection and Interviews
After informed consent was obtained, case-patients 
and controls were interviewed at home by trained inter-
viewers, in their native Bengali language, with a standard-
ized questionnaire. Information such as demographics, 
types of animal exposures, environmental and occupational 
exposures, exposure to ill persons, and history of illness 
was obtained. Proxy interviews of family members and/or 
friends were conducted for deceased patients. To minimize 
interview bias, proxy interview methods were also used for 
all controls that were matched to deceased case-patients.
Statistical Analysis
Exact ORs and 95% CIs were calculated by using a 
matched univariate logistic regression analysis in SAS ver-
sion 9.0 (SAS Institute Inc, Cary, NC, USA) (28). Associa-
tions were considered statistically signiﬁ  cant at p<0.05.
Results
Descriptive Characteristics
Four (33%) cases were conﬁ  rmed by EIA; the remain-
ing 8 (67%) case-patients, from whom a diagnostic speci-
men was not available, were considered probable cases. 
Among all 13 (36%) controls who consented to blood col-
lection, results of serologic tests for NiV-speciﬁ  c antibodies 
were negative. Furthermore, none of the controls reported 
having had a perceived fever or symptoms compatible 
with NiVE from December 15, 2003, through the week the 
study was conducted (February 18–22, 2004). In addition, 
an antibody prevalence study conducted among persons 
(n = 300) living in the outbreak site showed no evidence 
of asymptomatic or mild infection, which suggested that 
controls entered into the study were likely uninfected (A. 
Croisier, unpub. data). Proxy interviews were administered 
to equal proportions of case-patients (83%) and controls 
(Table 1). The median age of case-patients included in the 
study was 11.5 years (range 2–28 years); 9 (75%) were male, 
and 11 (91%) were <15 years of age (Table 1). Residences 
of all case-patients and controls were located within the af-
fected villages, an area with a radius of ≈800 m (Figure 1).
Animal Exposures
In the matched case-control analysis, a greater per-
centage of case-patients (60%) than controls (34%) had 
observed or touched dead animals, although this ﬁ  nding 
was not statistically signiﬁ  cant (Table 2). We observed 
no differences between case-patients and controls with re-
spect to contact with ill animals (Table 2), including pigs, 
ruminants, and fruit bats. Chickens and ducks were often 
slaughtered for religious purposes or for consumption; 
however, close contact with these animals and their bodily 
ﬂ  uids (e.g., blood, saliva) during this process was not as-
sociated with NiV infection (Table 2). None of the case-pa-
tients or controls had known contact with pigs (healthy or 
ill) or pig excreta (Table 2). Four (36%) of 11 case-patients 
and 7 (19%) of the controls observed fruit bats around their 
household during the night (OR 4.1, p = 0.49; Table 2). 
However, some proxy family members and/or friends an-
swering on behalf of patients who had died were unable to 
answer speciﬁ  c questions (e.g., Did you observe fruit bats 
around your house during the night?).
Environmental and Behavioral Exposures
A greater proportion of case-patients (83%) than con-
trols (51%) reported having climbed trees between Decem-
ber 15, 2003, and February 3, 2004 (OR 8.2, p = 0.025; 
Table 2). No statistically signiﬁ  cant differences were ob-
served between case-patients and controls with respect 
to outdoor activities such as hunting, ﬁ  shing, or playing 
outdoor games (e.g., hide-and-seek, cricket, soccer). Eat-
ing fruit that was locally available (on trees or collected 
from fruit trees locally) between December and February 
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Figure 2. Epidemic curve of Nipah virus outbreak in Goalando, 
Bangladesh, in 2004, demonstrating household clustering. 
Households 1 and 4 each had 2 cases, household 5 had 3 cases, 
and all other households, single cases.
Table 1. Descriptive characteristics of Nipah virus case-patients 
and controls, Bangladesh, January 2004 
No. (%) 
Characteristic Case-patients, n = 12  Controls, n = 36 
Sex 
  M  9 (75)  27 (75) 
  F  3 (25)  9 (25) 
Age group, y 
  1–5  1 (8)  3 (8) 
  6–10  4 (33)  12 (33) 
  11–15  6 (50)  18 (50) 
 16–20  0 0
 21–25  0 0
  26–30  1 (8)  3 (8) 
Interview type 
  Proxy  10 (83)  30 (83) 
  Self  2 (17)  6 (17) Risk Factors for Nipah Virus Encephalitis, Bangladesh
was not associated with illness, regardless of how the fruit 
was collected (from the ground, picked from tree, from the 
market) (Table 2). Although a greater proportion of case-
patients reported environmental exposures (drinking raw 
date palm sap, harvesting date palm sap, having someone 
in the household who collects date palm sap, or drinking 
sap directly from the collection vessel), these differences 
were not statistically signiﬁ  cant (Table 2).
NiVE Case Exposure
There were strong associations between illness and 1) 
visiting a hospital and/or 2) having had contact with a prob-
able or conﬁ  rmed NiVE patient (Table 2). In one 2-case 
family cluster, a mother (26 years of age) and her infant 
son (2 years of age) both became ill and died. The child 
became symptomatic 2 days before the mother’s illness 
onset (Figure 2; household 4). Among the other affected 
family clusters, the patients became ill within 3 days of one 
another (Figure 2; households 1 and 5); all persons in these 
2 clusters reported a history of climbing fruit trees. There 
was no evidence of contact of persons between case house-
holds during their illness.
Discussion and Conclusions
In contrast to the patients in the Malaysian and Singa-
pore outbreaks, which occurred primarily among adults, a 
preponderance of the NiV patients in the January/February 
2004 Bangladesh outbreak were young boys. These ﬁ  nd-
ings, in the absence of high infection rates among adults 
or evidence of antibodies to NiV in the general population 
(investigation team, unpub. data), suggest an association 
between NiV infection and some childhood activity or 
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Table 2. Exposures and activities associated with Nipah virus infection, Bangladesh, December 2003–January 2004*  
No. (%) study participants with reported exposure or activity†
Exposure or activity  Case-patients, n = 12 Controls, n = 36 OR (95% CI) p value‡
Animal exposure
  Touched any ill animal§ 9 (75) 31 (85) 1.8 (0.29–8.52) 0.613
  Touched or observ d a dead animal§ e
  Killed any animal§
6/10 (60) 12 (34) 2.4 (0.4–616.5) 0.392
3 (25) 6 (16) 1.8 (0.2–79.51) 0.670
 Other  animal  exposures
  Contact with animal stool 2/9 (22) 12 (35) 0.5 (0.05–3.04) 0.679
  Visited a poultry farm 3 (25) 13 (37) 0.6 (0.08–3.29) 0.740
  Observed fruit bats around household at night 
  (1 mo before outbreak)
4/11 (36) 7 (19) 4.1 (0.27–261.9) 0.491
Outdoor activity
  Climbed trees 10 (83) 19 (51) 8.2 (1.25–f) 0.025
  Picked fruit from trees 8 (67) 18 (49) 3.2 (0.54–36.0) 0.262
  Picked fruit from the ground 7/11 (64) 27 (74) 0.79 (0.13–6.09) 1.000
  Fished 6 (50) 10 (28) 4.5 (0.69–49.7) 0.139
  Hunted 2/10 (20) 10 (28) 7.3 (0.38–432.6) 0.240
  Played hide and seek 8/11 (73) 21 (58) 4.3 (0.38–f) 0.256
  Played cricket 4 (33) 18 (51) 0.5 (0.09–2.76) 0.552
  Played soccer 5 (42) 9 (24) 2.4 (0.44–16.9) 0.403
Exposure to human illness
  Had contact with a suspect or probable 
  Nipah virus encephalitis case-patient
8 (67) 3 (9) 21.4 (2.78–966.1) <0.001
  Visiting a hospital 12 (100) 7 (19) 32.4 (5.18–f) <0.0001
Consumption of fruit
  Bananas¶ 11 (92) 24 (67) 4.9 (0.61–226.7) 0.199
Buroys 7 (58) 28 (77) 0.4 (0.078–2.37) 0.433
  Papaya 3 (25) 14 (40) 0.49 (0.08–2.24) 0.497
  Guava 2 (17) 12 (33) 0.5 (0.05–2.70) 0.608
Sofeda 1 (8) 2 (5) 2.0 (0.03–38.4) 0.976
Kamranga 1 (8) 3 (9) 1.0 (0.006–165.9) 1.000
Other environmental exposures
  Drinking raw DPS 10/11 (91) 26 (72) 4.1 (0.47–197.0) 0.328
  Harvesting DPS 3 (25) 3 (8) 3.4 (0.37–43.6) 0.365
  Drinking DPS from collection vessel 5/10 (50) 12 (32) 1.7 (0.36–8.34) 0.612
  Someone in household collects DPS 4 (33) 5 (15) 2.3 (0.38–13.3) 0.454
*OR, odds ratio; CI, confidence interval; DPS, date palm sap. 
†Data are no. of study participants responding affirmatively/total no. responding (%) unless otherwise noted. 
‡Exact method using univariate conditional logistic regression. 
§Cows, horses, sheep, goats, pigs, ducks, chickens, dogs, cats, or fruit bats. 
¶Fruit was obtained from a market or another person, if not picked directly from the tree or ground. RESEARCH
speciﬁ  c behavior. The odds of NiV infection were signiﬁ  -
cantly elevated among persons who climbed trees, an activ-
ity observed almost exclusively among boys <15 years of 
age. This behavior is quite common among children because 
they gather fruit from trees. Therefore, these children may 
have had contact with partially eaten fruit from fruit bats or 
the secretions/excretions of these animals. Or, the children 
may have contacted contaminated fruit bat guano or urine 
in the trees. The percentages of case-patients playing hide-
and-seek, hunting, and ﬁ  shing—all of which were typical 
behaviorial traits of local boys—were not signiﬁ  cantly dif-
ferent than those for controls. These activities generally oc-
cur outdoors; however, they do not place a child in direct 
contact with bat excretions or secretions, as may be true for 
tree climbing. Therefore, infection was apparently related 
to a speciﬁ  c behavior, tree climbing, rather than age or out-
door activities in general. Furthermore, although other ex-
posures that may have placed persons in closer contact with 
bat secretions (e.g., collecting fruit or palm sap from trees, 
drinking palm sap directly from collection vessel) were ob-
served more often among case-patients than controls, these 
ﬁ  ndings were not statistically signiﬁ  cant; perhaps because 
of the small sample size. Nonetheless, our ﬁ  ndings can and 
have been used to help guide NiV outbreak investigations, 
leading investigators to similar conclusions as ours (29).
Fruit bats forage at night in various trees that are pro-
ducing ripe fruit and often drink from palm sap collection 
vessels (30). Fruits are also a major food source for many 
villagers and, as a result of environmental disturbances (31) 
in the form of crop development (e.g., jute, rice, and sugar 
cane), the few remaining fruit trees grow only in close prox-
imity to human dwellings (Figure 1). This in turn creates a 
situation in which fruit bats are forced into close proximity 
with humans, especially while these mammals are forag-
ing and feeding. In addition, date palm sap is routinely col-
lected in rural areas of Bangladesh between December and 
May. According to villagers, including palm sap harvest-
ers, dead fruit bats are occasionally found in the collection 
vessels. Local villagers reported that they often observed 
fruit bats feeding from palm sap collection vessels, and 
some collectors place cloth over the opening of the vessel 
to prevent this (investigational team observation). In fact, 
a greater proportion of case-patients in our study collected 
palm sap, drank from the palm sap collection vessel, or had 
a family member who collected palm sap; however, these 
differences were not statistically signiﬁ  cant. The power of 
our study to detect exposure risks was limited by the out-
break size. Therefore, until additional data are available, 
remaining cautious of date palm sap collection vessels, es-
pecially those visibly contaminated with fruit bat excreta or 
carcasses, would be prudent.
Numerous investigators have found serologic evidence 
suggesting that fruit bats of the genus Pteropus are the 
reservoir hosts for NiV (23,24), and there are reports of 
NiV isolation from bat urine (20,25) and partially eaten 
fruit (20). Unpublished laboratory data from the Bangla-
desh investigation have not supported the presence of an 
intermediate or primary reservoir host other than P. gigan-
teus. Available data from this study, therefore, suggest di-
rect transmission of NiV to humans through contact with 
bat secretions or excretions (saliva, urine, guano, partially 
eaten fruit) during fruit-tree climbing.
Although indirect contact with bats may have been the 
primary means of infection for this outbreak, Hsu and oth-
ers (19) demonstrated that contact with ill cows was asso-
ciated with an increased risk for NiV infection during the 
2001 Bangladesh NiV outbreak. Therefore, intermediated 
hosts should be considered in future NiV outbreaks in Ban-
gladesh.
In contrast to the patients in the Malaysia and Singa-
pore outbreaks (5,16,17,25,26), most of the Bangladesh 
population (and all of the case-patients included in this 
study; data not shown) are practicing Muslims who do not 
consume pork and who avoid contact with pigs. None of 
the case-patients and controls in our study population re-
ported any contact with pigs or pig excreta, so it is unlikely 
that these animals played a role in this outbreak.
Clustering of cases within households was a prominent 
feature of this outbreak (Figure 2); 1 household contained 
3 case-patients, all brothers of ages 7–15 years. However, 
the longest estimated incubation periods (duration from 
symptom onset to ﬁ  rst known exposure to a NiVE family 
member) within the clusters reported here were less than 
the currently recognized 4-day minimum (7). This ﬁ  nding 
suggests that the family clustering may have resulted from 
a common source of infection (e.g., a speciﬁ  c tree they 
climbed, fruit they consumed, or palm sap collection ves-
sel they were in contact with) rather than person-to-person 
transmission. Our data also show strong associations be-
tween NiV infection and visiting a hospital. However, be-
cause the participants were asked if they had visited a hos-
pital within a range of dates (December 15, 2003–February 
3, 2004) and not a speciﬁ  c date, we were unable to deter-
mine if they were ill with NiV before visiting the hospital or 
whether they acquired their infection there. Some accounts 
in the literature suggest person-to-person transmission of 
NiV; therefore, it is plausible that someone could acquire, 
through contact with a patient’s secretions or excretions, 
an NiV infection while visiting a hospital (6,10,20). Nev-
ertheless, the most probable explanation for the observed 
association is that NiV encephalitis patients during this out-
break were severely ill, requiring hospitalization.
Although person-to-person transmission may have oc-
curred in this outbreak, the initial infection (index case) 
may have occurred through contact with bat secretions 
rather than contact with an intermediate host. A limitation 
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of our study is that we were unable to identify a speciﬁ  c 
mechanism by which person-to-person transmission may 
have occurred. NiV has been isolated from the respiratory 
secretions and urine of patients in the Malaysia, Singapore, 
and current Bangladesh outbreaks (3,8,32,33), which sug-
gests a potential for NiV to be transmitted from person 
to person. Data based upon chain-of-transmission events 
and clustering of cases during other 2003 and May 2004 
Bangladesh outbreaks led investigators to conclude that 
human-to-human transmission may have occurred (3,19). 
Therefore, given the potential for household or nosocomial 
transmission, we recommend the use of personal protective 
equipment (i.e., gloves, masks, gowns, and eye protection); 
strict hand hygiene and surface disinfection during and af-
ter contact with an NiVE patient; isolation of patients with 
conﬁ  rmed or suspected NiV infection; and proper disposal 
of potentially contaminated materials.
In summary, tree climbing, a behavior largely engaged 
in by young boys, was associated with an increased risk for 
NiV infection; although the exact mode of transmission is 
unclear. Our data do not rule out the potential for person-to-
person transmission. If person-to-person transmission were 
extremely efﬁ  cient, the conditions and population density 
of Bangladesh (≈1,000 persons/km2; total population 141 
million/144,000/km2) may have resulted in a much larger 
outbreak. Indeed, a study among health workers in Ban-
gladesh did not ﬁ  nd evidence of incidental transmission to 
persons caring for patients hospitalized with Nipah-related 
illnesses (34). Bat-to-human was the most probable route 
of transmission in Goalando; however, some undetermined 
intermediate or incidental hosts cannot be ruled out. Pe-
riodic introductions of NiV to human populations in this 
region may continue to occur because of the overlapping 
nature of human and pteropid bat habitats. Moreover, bat–
human interactions are likely to increase due to bat habitat 
loss because the few fruit trees that remain will likely be 
found in close proximity to human dwellings (Figure 1).
As a prevention measure, we recommend avoiding 
contact with fruit bats and their secretions/excretions. We 
also encourage persons to wash and/or peel fruit, in ad-
dition to washing their hands, before preparing meals or 
consuming fruit. Greater understanding of the relationships 
between pteropid fruit bats, NiV, and its transmission to hu-
mans might offer additional strategies for safe coexistence 
and disease prevention for Bangladesh and other countries 
where fruit bats reside. Finally, because the geographic 
range of this highly lethal pathogen may correspond to the 
distribution of the genus Pteropus, including parts of China 
and Australia, most of the Indian subcontinent, and South-
east Asia (12,30), factors that promote transmission from 
bats to humans need to be deﬁ  ned and the role of person-to-
person transmission needs to be better characterized.
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